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lz±:i^: all t]-is, \. ero probably influenced by the postibllity of the
penetration of the continent.
The blend of tliese, and perhaps some minor influences, account
for the persistence and steadfastness of Italian ambitions
.. ith ref-
erence to llorth Africc:. and ir. r.icular I'ripoli; ambitions ..hich
V. ere manifested bach in t:*ie da^'-s ..hen Italian unity vvas little more
than a dream,
-.s early as 1838, tliree years after S irkey had pro- ^
cli'ir.ied I:ri-ooli a vilayet of the Empire, Llazzini and other • prominent
statesmen of the day, looking into the future, asserted tl.at Tripoli
1 ^ • /
must belong, to Italy. .
'
-or was this qtout) alor e am:)n,, .].o..e Italians of the Risorgi-
menLo ..lio comprehended vvhat must be ths future trend of Italian polic "
in reference to Tripoli. In 1842 Geaare Lalbo, statesman, diplomat
...
-:cl soldier, ..ritinr., in t];e Dolle Spcranze d'ltalia, a' publiccjtion
which •..as for a ^ime the literary repQs^itory for Italian political
ambi'-ions, said, "Italy, as soon as she ie independent, as soon as
s- tisfaction shall be -£;iven for th needs which meam/hile must occupy
her thoughts to '^he exclusion of ail else, will have in turn to think
of her need of expansion eastward and south.vard which all Gliristian
people feci* Then if N aples is able to aquit herself well of her
part ac second pOv.er in t]_e v.orh of independence sne 'vvill be called
1 to play the part in the v.ork of er.pansion, '.Vhether it be Tunis
2
cr Tripoli or any part of the Eastern continent matters not."
'^itj. the attainment of her u;:it:/ the alpha and omega of Italian
foreign policy became directed to expansion in Ai'rica and especially
in Tripoli. - „u Italy ., . .Jo.;- ' tv;o decades after her unification
incapable of accomplishing • er African ambitions •..as due zo a eombin-
Sib.on's Ee.. I^a-i of Eu-'-o-ie 241.
E
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atior: of political and econonic i'^rce-s. 2hat period v;ae filled v.ith
seriouG internal problems for the nov. state. Politically and econom-
ically Italy v/as nnorganized ; and the problems of orr;^.nizatior
•..ero of necessity h3r first conoern. 'YLen „in<^lly Italy did turn to
trie construction of a colonial empire it was for t>:e time being to
East Africa ..here the possibilitios of oiopor^i lio seamed less n
al^r.[^ iiorth Africj.;"^ littortl. 3he diSc.-oe_^ of Adov.a T;ith ics
accompanying disgr.ce and discredit gave an abrupt pause to Italian
efforts in that field» ilovrever the effects of the defeat at Ad07;a did
not stop ;.ith the limitation of Italian plans In :i.as. ...frica, but in-
fluenced t] e Italians deeply ?/ith regard to all colonial sc]:emes, and
tended to create a pessimistic attitude 0:1 future colonial ventures.
At the same ti;-c it created a desire amon;^ a fe.. at least, nocably in
military circles, to eradicate the blot of Ado,, a by a successful pen-
etration of i^orth Africa.
Ar^ain during this period a group of pacifist socialists cane into'
control of the government. Internationalism v.as advocated as the orde •
of the day. Nationalism anri colonial ventures were frov;ned upon, an:-"!
attemps ;.-ere made to discredit those who supported suc3. ideas.
Ilov.ever
-v.itl; the advent of tho twentieth ceniury the internation-
al socialists began to
-lose ground rapidly. The reaction that no., r- - +
in, carriocl 'r— pendulum a:j the of'er extreme, strong nationalism.
Once under way the nationalistic mcvemenu met with little resistance,
since the control of the soci^.lists had at b-v-st been uncertain and
filtering. In fact b;- 1905 the national- ..ero i. complete control
^rid. v.ere backed by the great majority of the people. At tha . time
Italy found herself for tie firsu time in her history pr.paroa polit-
ically, economically and intellectually for expansion, and although
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Italy had novor before been in a pOGi'uior. to maize effective lier col-
onial ambitions, uhose ambitions had ronained alive and had steadily
developed fron tj:e time of her unification. In 1871 7/hile the seat
of the
,
,overnr.ien yet at Florence, Italy mad' her first at-.c:zij)t
to eet..blish herself in I'orth Africa. ire able liavin^ arisen with the
Bey of Tunis over the ri,'2;ht of asylum, Italy brohe off relations vrith
the Bq:; and prepared to send a fleet to I'unis ; and v;aG only -deucrred
from taking action by a protest from the French government, based upor
the grounds that Italian military denomstrations at Tunis v/ould en-
courage an Arab uprising which was takin,-^-, on serious proportions in
Algeria, and a curt not 3 from the Porte stating that if Italy sent a
fleet to Tunis it \;ould bo met at La G-oulette by a Turlris?; squadron.
Tjien France, in 1882 anne::^:eci Tunis, and removed that province
from th-: sphere of possibilities, Italian colonial ambitions were
further focused on Tripoli, Only four years later di P.obilant, Ital- .
ian Iliniste..; for Foreigji Affairs, discussing the renewal of the Triple
Alliance, requested assurances against French expansion in Ilorth
2
Africa, and specific :.-lly i.'-^ the direction of Tripoli. A 3''ear later,
in irsV, an anonymous Italiar. ..ri'jer who entitled himself " Sk-Diplomat '
writing in the Ihaova Antologia said, "To innovation in trie Mediterran-
ean and especially in Africa will b'3 posrible -..ithout our consent.
"Je are therefore insured against ulio posr.ibility of eve-.tf: such as
occurred at. Tunis, being repeate. in Tripoli."
Three years later Grisri, realising fully the importance of Trip-
1 jjarcTay, Turco-I :alian 'Tar and its Problems, 55.
2
,„
"'allace, Qre^to- i:aly, -p.4r..
Ibid.
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oli -L; Ital:', took steps to pave tLe v.ay for Italiar. action In that
direction. u.i July 25th 1090, he dispatched a r.ote to lord Salisbury/
requesting English sanction for the Italian schemes in 'Iripoli. Lord
Salisbur: ro-" iecl ..If he following sagacio
-s noto"The Italian Gov-
erii..:..ru- ..11_ have -ripo^itc^nia but th: huntsman to bring down the
stag must wait until it co-er. vjif h . q range of his gun so that
even wounded it ...tll not escape."-^ ./hilo Gr:spi's at'.er.ipts to Eccuro
i^nglish s^v..cuijn lor Italian schemes in Tripoli were thus turned aside
by th
.
cautious Englishman, his efforts in another direction v.ere
more fruitful; for in the same year he too]: steps to secure by various
means the friendship oh hussuna. Pasha ixaramanli, a man of great ir-
fluence and the descendant of the old Pashaws of Tripoli.^ That his
efforts v.ere entirely sucoof rful uas proved forty year-G later v;hen at
f:o tine of the Italian occuxjation of Tripoli, hassuna Pasha was one
of the ^rab shi|jj:s who accepted the Italian allegience, and wug from
the first to tJie last loy.:il to th 3 Italians.^
^igaiii in 189G, the Marchese Yisconti Yenosta, Minister for For-
eign Affairs, in t]jG course of some agreements with France regarding
Tunis, emphasized the positi.^;'- oh Italy with reference to Jriy-oli, ana.
pointed out definitely tl^at hri-pol-i should eventually be compensation
4.
lor ul e loss of Tanis. " ilor was the Italian attitude toward Tripoli
confined to the small ^lou-n of statermen who sat a', the Go.-^sulta; io
was on the contrary S-.urud b,, the masses of the Italian people. Their
feelings on the matter were significantly demonstrated in 1899 when
the minis tr- foil because of the alarm which spread thrau-h Iialy upon
hearing oh ...g -.nglo-Fr ench agreoaent of that year defining spheres o f
^ 7/allace, Greater Italv, "o. 115.
I Old.
Wallace, Greater .^u>^ly p. 121.
Ibid.
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influence in -'vfrica and affecting the Tripolitan liintorlancl. The
Marcher,e Visocnti Yenoeta v/ac recall od to t>o Foroi^-n Office and was
able uo set in motion the ne{j.o Jiations whicai resalted in the Franco-
Italian agreement of 19C1. In that ^-^ear the two countrieG reached a
definite- iindorstcnding regarding; Uorth Africa in a protocol ..hercb:
it was arranged tl,a« if Franco should ever erxtend a protectorate over
Ivlorocco, Ital;; should "be compensated by 'Tripoli and Barca v/ith the
Pezcan as a hinterland. Italy's :.-ig'.ts in Tripoli wore to be recog-
.
ised and should the status quo of llorth -^frica be again disturbed
France wac to raise no objections to Italian occupation of Trixooli.-^
Although this protocol has neven been published there is ample evid-
ence of its e:'Listance. In Doceobor 1901, i:. Delcasi.-e, spe^liing in
the Chamber of Deputies, announced 'chat France had no intentions of
extending her influence beyond t]:o limits set by tl^.e Anglo-French
convention of 189.;-. a f ,.. days later in a statement to the French
correspondent for the Giornale d'lt.Jia he asserted that France and
c
Italy had reached an agreement on the Jlort}; African question. In u.
still more definite statement to the Chamber of DepUbies i. ±902 /le
said, "In .-eturn for the assurance given b France not to intei'fere
i:-^ Tripolitania, Italy'^has promised to do nothing which could obstruc
French policy in Liloroceo
.
It is evident that England too at t'-.is time gave her consen- to
the Italian preemption of Tripolitania; fo- r:-_ questioned on the
subject in 1902 in tiie Chamber of Deputies Primetti, Blinister for
___
^
Cilu 'ns lew Map of Surope, p. 242
2
Barclay, Turho-It ..lian '.Var- and Its Problems, p. 55.
rrO
7/allace. urov^uer Italy, ^^d. 116.
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Foroicn Affairpj, roplied thai: England had given assurances almost
identical with those given by Franco.^ I - is indeed thought thatci'-
was proD-ble that somo of t:^-LG o'o]i:jr -'C-.;Grs of surn-^n lil^owise gave
sanction uo u..o i oulian rigi ,e in Jripoii uu abouu uhe same tine or
shortly later; for in 1005 Signor Tittoni announced to the Italian
Senate that the Povv-erc had recognized Italy's
-or eGn-n uion of 'Iri-noli,
but tliat so long as Italian interests v/ero not disturbed there would
be no actual ocoupntion. In 1906, however, at the international con-
ference of Algeciras Italy's rights in Tripoli v/ere clefi::itely rccog-
n i z ed by th e Powers.'^
Italy no., cane to regard with jealous ey^e the least interference
of either a foreign power or Turkey herself i.n Tripoli. In 1906 v;hon
the French sent a force to occupy the oasis of Belma the action sent
a considerable stir th rough Italy. The- Giornale d'It.^lia prot :stecl
vigorously, declaring that the Frencl: were acq.riring all the traffic
routes from the int :ri int . Tri-ooli. In 1908 just before the Young
Turk revolution Italy and Turkey had a quarrel over the rights of
Italians i:- Tri-joli. Tnrhe^-' ;es forced to concede every point, but
at that time the Italians ..enu so far as to make naval .demonstrationb
Again in 1910 It_.ly even rot est ed when the Turkish Gover'.ment sent
troops to Tripoli.
So things stood when the Iloroccon affair, in 1911, disrupted the
ilor-. .^xloLin status quo. Italy had established her claims on Tripol:
-nci -ad secured them by agreements ..ith the Po-.,ers of iilurope. Tripoli
had ueo^- officially reco^inized as the terra promissa of Italy. With
jBngland and France at least, definite understandings existed; and as
_________ ^ _ .
Walla'^e,G-r eater Italy, lo. 117.
2
Gibbons lie
. Map of 3uro-'-G, 242.
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^bove noted the Po\vers had recoc::i:^ eel Italy's rlr^.ZB at .ageciras.
-iiid to t; e Italians there was no doulDt but .hat Tripoli belonged to
t'lem h-v th^ rlr-],t of historj?-, compensation and necossity.
Buring
.I.e sane years that Italian statesmen v.er: establishing
:he rights of Italy in Tripoli by means of diplomacy, a movement of
equal importance v.a;. being carried on by the Italians in Tri-ooli i .-
celf, the economic penetration of tl.e couir.r; . a.his process of
peaceful or economic penetration was begun shortly after the disaster
of Adowa, and mighu, if it had been allo;;ed to go on unc- ec.tod, have
..on Tripo.i for Italy without a bio... She policy was inaugurated on
v.,st scale in 1900, and /.as carefully fostered dov/n to 1911. I'hc
first important st.ep T/as the establishment of t>'G Banco di Rom.-,
institution corresponding to the 3usso-G?iinese b.uL. in Manchuria ..r
Che. Bancue de Paric et des Pays 3as in Liorocco."^ The Banco di Home
^i^ originally capitalized at |4, 000, 000, -..jiich was later i-creased
10 sp6, 0^0,000. It immediately began inLmonse financial ventures in
the vilayet. Industrial schemes of any sort
-;;]_ic]i v, ere suitable to
t::e country v.ers undertaken. Corn mills were established. An Es-
parto Grass mill
-....l p.irc;-aLcd and put imo operc/.ion, the largest
establishment of it: hind in iTipoli. The Banco was part proprietor
of an oil and soap factory. It bought and operated a sponge factory
from v.hie" i'c literally flooded the market •.itji spiuigos. An ice
factory v.as. started but owing to the slight demand for ice was not
successful. Elocoric light works were established. A lieavily sub-
siclized steam ship line began to make Tripoli, jern- and iicxb^.^zi
ports of call. An im-mense flour mill was built at Benghazi. Jhe
I t^,li:;n parcel pos t system, of the most Gf.icient in iliarope was
Kc Cullagh, Italy's ""ar for a Desert, p. i^.

(11;
Gxteiided to the interior and. t'r.e ostrich feather trade, was diverted
IrLo Italian cr:annels. Interior railroads and hanking systens Y/ero
:-omtem^^le tod. Prao tlcc.11-^ of t]ie reelainable land in Tripoli
• • bough o U;: the JJanc o • ^liver:: effort wab made to control the
resourcer;, industrial and ar;;ricultural of the province.
That all t]:is v;ar; done under t e secret auspices of the Italian
jovornuonu uhoro- se little do .b - . The director of the Banco waL
iSi^nor Pacelli, a man v^hose as^.ociation with the covernoent v/as v/ell
hno\.n. he had a larf:e circle of friends among v/hom. '...ere man^' gover_ -
mcnt officials, uho ...^Su impor taii'« oeing Baron Sonnino, whose Jour-
nal, the "Giornale d'ltalia", stoutl^ ch.-.mpionKl the Banco and all
i:s ventures. Sir;nor Titto^-^i's orothor was the vi-e--or esident of t] o
concern and several of t}.e menberc of the governmenu ovmed stock,
.idded to these were various other bits of evidence which pointed con-
vincingly to a lin:; betv:ec-n the Banco and the Italian 'government,
sucli as, f-r instance, the concesGion of the rig] t -o issue postal
orders to the Benghazi and Tripoli branches of the Banl:. Moreover,
It is righl:; improbable t>at a group of -^rrivat- capitalists -:,oulcl
-
^ve ^omitted the notorious business dealings of the Janco, Tno
greater part of its venturer were carried on in such a manner that
tl:ey resulted in financial looses, the total looses agg:regating sev-
oral .million. Its oil and soap factory waS the only speculation in
v.hic" it indulged which v/as a marked financial succesc, and that wa^
probably due to the efforts of the partner in t^ie concern. Signer
Gibbon's Be\: Map of Europe, p. 244
Ibid.
allace. Greater Italy, p. 15.
- Ibid. T). 16.
^ LcGrll > h, It.l- '-^orh for a Desert, --. ^.
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Balciari. i'Le Benrjhazi flour mill was the most; unfortunate venture
zh^t the Banco partioipated in.
,
The mill uas erected at the cost of
1,000,000 lire. Tlien finished and in ope-^'ation it v;as found that
there were onl:; four or five sacks of flour to be {.round per d^v. 2he
acricultural ventures of the Banco were so miserabl:/ nismanased that
they disgusted even the Italian government. Yast tracts of land v.ere
bou- iro at e -rate of ten lire per acre and sold for t'./o. - Condi--
tions eventually reached such a state that the govermvient sent an in-
spector to e:^amine the boohs of tie banks. The local director, hov/-
ever, was able to stav 3 off t investigation, and the v;ar coming a
fev. v/eeks later prevented a further investigation. During the war
all of the important war contracts were let to the Banco in spite of
-
. , . „ 1
c e lower uids from ot^ier contractors.
These operation, w'':ich could not for long escape the notice of
the Turkish government, were winked at be the officials of ..bd;-,l
.-amid, their consciences being quieted by Italian gold. 'i.i. .h.e
passing of the old regime and the advent of the Young Turks t. is
la:city changed. The arden
.. if misguided . members of the ne.. government
threw every pes ible ]-.indraJce in the way 01 r
. Itc^lian projects in
xripoli. T; e Italian Gonsul-General was repeatedly insulted. Itc^lia
citizenr. i.;: Tripoli were subjected to every possible indigrl:y, thougl
..e may not believe the exaggerated stories recited b,. uho Italians
who ..ished to malie the c..,se as bad as po sr.- ible. The Young Turks took
direct steps to curb the rising power of tlie Banco di Homa. »ery
new Yali of Tripoli was carefully instructed to hinder the ac .ivi uies
of the Banco in every way possible. Ilonopolies were refused and its
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business ventures '..Gro sr/stenaticall;/ otGjrnctod. The lact straw was
en tl::o P • granted, to Grornau^- co- -^..1.. ii.ijor
-^.n^j railroad cone es-
3iDn.3 .. 1 "been refused the Italians.
These operations, the policy of obstruction pursued by the YovTir;
Turks, had t}_Gir repercussion in Italy and aroused uracil indignation.
The Italians saw their cherished dre^.ns being th-'.varted, and their
citizens insulted by the Young Turks. They saw plainly that if allo;v-
GG to continue t].eir polic;- of opposition in Tripoli the Young Turks
v;ould soon destroy the econor.iic hold that Italy had acquired there.
This change in Turkish attitude, then, and realization by the Italians
of 7.hat ±z v.ould result in for their schemes if all^^., to con tinue,
prepared them for more drastic action.
It
..„.s indeed one of the iDjnediate occasions of the Libyan ..ar.
^here were others 3:o..ever of equal or greater ii.iportanc e , among ..hicji
uhe disruption of the Eorth African status quo at .igadir v.-as foremost.
Since the Franco-Italian and Anglo-Italian agreements of 1901 Morocco
..ripoli had been inseparably linked i-; ..:.c- minds of the Italians.
It '..ill be remembered that according to the terms of these agreements
Italy was to be allowed to occupy Tripoli if France should ever take
Ei::rilar action in Ilorocco. As long as France had refrained from t ."k-
ing such action Italy had been content with her policy of economic
penetration by ..hich means she was securing a powerful hold on the
country, ilov.
,
ho\.'ever, . e Young Turks -.vere threatening that economic
domination, and Italy no longer felt safe in trusting to that alone
to maintain her hold u--^on Tri-^-iOli. T- e Moroccon affair, bringing into
operation the agreement, ..i:; Franco and England, opened the ..^j for
more aggressive measures.
In another and perhaps more indirect ..ay, the crisis of Agadir
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prccipitu tecllwal;.'' s cleecGrit upon ^-i-ipoli. For some tine pas- Italy
had suspect Gcl her ally^ Germany, of ambitions in Tripoli. The Ger-
mans l"£d recently establiiErhorl a banhing system in Tri-noli, •..::ic-
.
ti: rough ui-c .id ^avcr. by Young Turks,, had surpass ed on influenoe
even tiie Banco di Roma. German steamships were mahing the Tripolitan
coast tov.ns portr of call, and a great c!e;vl of intorest seemed to bo
centercci i:^ ^ooarl.. Jaturally these ^ er.,: ui-^nb ..or... very dist...Sw^ai
to the Italians as it v.as feared that Germany, basking in the favor
of the Turks, might got control of Tripoli. lYhrn iridorlen-^aocht or
then, precipitated the crisis whiciav.adir and Ge:-::i:„: = y oc^cne involved
in a controversy wit]: Prance c. . ;gland, Italy welcomed the oppor-
tunity to make good lier claims on Trl;-oli \.'2:ile the hands of her all^^
..ere tied by the Korocc/n aff...ir.
The action of Austria in annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908
also hud its i^-fluence on her action tov.ard Tripoli. Austria's action
h d d. no ns t r cci the rottenness and helplessness of Turkey. Tiiat
Austria had done in bold defiance of tjie international covenant of
Berlin and the sovereignty of t': e Turkish Empire, Italy felt justifi ,
in duplico.v.ii:f in regard to ' jli.
This combination of elements, then the disruption of t'o Berth
..ifrieon status quo at Agadir, -f^- r-rov/ing fear of German activities
in Tripoli, and the eff oc t of u'..^ r..-a-Turkish .^.x^ct Ic-n-Islciiic noYc-
ments on Italian interests in that province determined the Italians
to proceed to the actual occupation of Tripoli.
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Chapter II
She 7?ar
Rumblings of the approaching trouble began to b .. heard as earl;/
ae Jul;- 1911. On Jul^ 29 Ital;^? notified her anbasraclors th t un]£. sr:
Turkey al.ored her attitude respocLing Italian intorosts in Tripoli
,.ar vvould be declared. Turkey made no attempt to change conditions.
On the contrary an anti-Italian demonstratiOTi too"-
-^laco at Consten'-
1 nopic on September 22. i'herefore on oGpuembor iio Italy dispatched
^.n ulti::iatum to xurliey stating her grievancest v/hich vvere in tlie mai.:
the antagonistic measures taken b:/ the Porte toward Italian interoEtc
i.--: xripoli and the treatment of Italian citizens uhore), and ir.formin^
the Turkish governemnt that unless Turkey i.mmediately wit) dre?/ from
t?.e province of Tripoiitania and Oyrenaica and offered redress for :.].:-
ivrongs done to Italy, war v. ould oo declared ano. Jiie provinces forciLl_
accupicd. The conciliatory answer of the Porte being deemed unsatic-
fi.ctory, war was declare-d on September 29, 1911. On the same aftea-
noon three Tur!:ish torpedo boats v.ero su ... ofi' rrevcc^ on th E^iro .
c oast.
It is safe to suy t- at seld«,m in the histor:' of the world ]-.as
..^-.r come so unexpectedly."^ On September ^-6 -^hu ..orld ao k^.-go receiv-
ed its first hint that there v/ere serious difficulties between Turkey
and Italy. ..;efore it had tia.e to learn evon what those grievances
..ere, Italian ....rships ..ore sin_ ing Tar_ iii-_ torpedo boats and begin-
^
International Year 3ook, 1911, p. 708.
Barclay, Turko Italian Tar and its Problems, p. 21.

il6]
ning_ their descent upon Tripoli.-'- Germany sn d Austria ,.ere as much
in the dark as ti e rest of the- world and their surprise vras evinoec^
by 'o.-G storm of invective that came from t]:ieir presses at the staru,^
On September 29th t;.o divisions of th: Italianr,. fl-et appeared off
Tripoli. The Vali
,
realizing the futility of resistance, ordered tl.o
evacuation of t.'.e to. n, and v/it]; themain part of /lis forces \.it]:dre..
into the desert. On October 4th the fleet bombarded the tovvn and a
naval brigade was landed. On October 11th the main body of the troops
arrived and \.ere landed ".;ithout mishap. Oivil ad:;iinistra -ion v/as at
once provided by the appointment of a vice-governor and a mayor.
T] c two other important coast towns, Benghazi and Derna, fell before
the end of the month, Derna on the 0th and Benghazi on the 19th.
The first serious resistance to tj-o Italians cane on Oc'tober 25rc
in an attach which lasted until tl. e 26th and cane near resultin/;^ in
disaster for t" c Italians. On the 2crd the Arabs and zl.q Tur...s in t^-(
desert in front of the Italian lines attached the Italianc in force.
Simultaneously ti e Arabs of t e oasis, a seriop of r;arcie"''s immediately
b China the Italian linos , o j.ad be ..n armoc.. u Zi.q xurhs ^.i ^.. rifles
from Derna before they evacuated the to..n, rose and set upon the Ital-
ians from tj:o 'rear. For a time t}_c Italian contor ..a^: in disorder,
uhc troops confuse^ o„- mists of the- corning thoagi. „ ti.e ^'ur-.s i.ua
Droken through the lines and were in their rev..r. i:ad the Turks be^ n
able to attacZ-c in greater force . tine that the Ar,.:bs of the
Oasis rose, i - is probable tha .. the Italians would .ave been serio^^sl;
defeated. The Italians have been a accused of unnecessary slauri_ter
i/: clearing the oasis, and of butchery amounting to atrocities. -he
^ Barclay, Turco- Italian ''^ar and its Problems, p. 21.
2 Ibid.

facts of t' CSC " Yer seen to be thau tho Italians, confronted
v.'ith treachery and a situation Y,hieh imperiled the entire- Italian
army, tooh
. ^ Gf;:ective stops to insure their own safety. Thv^
t
sorno barbarous acts were conLiit ed is doubtless true but frenzied as
they v.ere by the sudden attach in their rear, the Italians could
hardly ]:avc ueen e::pected to deal gently v;if: the treacherous Arabs.
Meanwhile conditions in Turkey T/ere in cliaos. The Grand Vizer
Ilalijci Pasha, had up to the very last minute refused to believe that
I-.i ir.t -jr. Gd to attach xurkcy.l Only a fe.. ;. e<iks pri 'jr to the out-
bre; of hostilities he had withdrawn troops from Tripoli to send
into the leman to quell a revolt there, and ..hon criticised by Shevhe
Pasha, Kinlstor of 7ar, had laughed away his fears of Italy's inten-
tion to attach Turkey. As a result of his blindness tie sudder. oat-
breah of the war discredited hi;- and his 'governi^ent. T}'e ran]:s of
ohe opposition swelled and their outcries bc.-^ue an uproar. Ilakhi
Pasha resigned, and u-on the advico of the Committee of Union and
Progress, the Sultan c.;lled Said Pasha to form a new cabinet. ^
however 8.e usual in times of crisis the govor.h.on.
..as p^rctlized
and hopelessly lost in a maze of cross purposes.^ The entire stat
seemed for a tl-e to be on the verge of disruption. - Toward the end
of the year however the government became more stable
, and wus able
t:-roughout the rest of the v.ar to offer at lead^ a passive resistance
to the Italian occupation. I^nver Eey was recalled from Berlin where
^-e >ad been serving as Military
.Vttao.:o ..nd sent to .ri>oli to take
1 C-ibbons, Bev? Kap of Europe,
-d. 247.
luid.
Dillon, Hew Tir.i s, Te,. L jses, Contemparary Review, V./.,.. lOO
,
-.720
luid.

;c •' argc of the TnrVis"- .md .^rab forces there. 'Throu{:hout ho proved
himself an able general and a good organizer, in spito of the meager
means that he had to uork with. ?or in all t er or/ere not more than
live thouscmd Turkish troops in Tripoli, "he;/ vvere ho., ever armed \:± :}
modern field artiller^r,
: : ov: ev e
. , th e Turks had th e considerable a dvan t ag e of 1 1 o almo s t
solid support of the xirab'-; of the country. The., were implacable in
ui:eir opposition to tiie Italians throughout the war. T]-.eir extreme
attitude was principally duo to t] e activities of t: o con-fratei^nit-^-
of t e Senussi, the strongest X-Johammedan sec": in ilfrica. The very
heart of t]:c con-fraternity was in Tripoli, and its principal foyers
v/ero Jerabub, Barhn. , and Kafr^. From, the beginning of the v/ar t}:is
po'iverful sect he..d ... e table lands of Cyren<^i-'a and ^.ero Lhe leadorL
of tl- e rcsistaroo to tho Italian;; ever^T^vl- ere. Inspired a:, they were
by religious -h iticism they were untiring in t'leir effortr to op-ose
Italian progr...i.s, and to rouse the masi:os of t". o Triyolitan .irabs
cictive resisianoe. They : eld the hinterland and all of the fortified
citadels of the interior.^ They were so pov/erful t h o Italians
never completely pacified ... - m. In 1915 v.he." It^.ly became embroil eel
in the European War, they rose again in open revolt^ and are at t" e
^resent time unpacified.
-ifter t"
. cngagem^ent of t:':e 2Srd, 26th and. 27th an intervd of
cuiet ensued.. The Italians v/ero able to drive the Turks and Arabs
jeyond the lines and to clear the ground imnor'^ iat ely in front of t" e
oity. On I-ovember 6th the Italian parliament Lane -io:-.ea a x^oyal Deere
annexing the provences of • Tripoliiania and G^/renaica, and constituting
Tnite, Senussi and Military Iscues i- Tripoli, hinet— -t^ Oentury
Vol. 71, -o. 1216.
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t':on as t" o It. lia-' •' 'Vinoe of Ilb^v.. J'.iic ..as indeed a drastic
niev-.sure and apparently in vi.jlation of in t ornational lav/. Aside from
the el;jiic.s of the case it has been seriously questioned whether it
..as to acl.vantase of Ital:' "t^o taho s.ic: a step. l aving once a:
-
no: cd i'ripolitania no comprise -..LiL possible. JPe Tvar
vvas then and there destined to be fought to a dofinite conclusion
and any nediatioi-a or arbitration tending to adj at . the elains of
Italy was barred.
The Italians occupied t}:G last months in 1911 in cleaning up the-
GOac- ciind t-hlng --on
.
essio^n o:^ - country 1, immediately bL.ck of
it. Ihe interior hov^ever ronained unconquered and fighting continued
there fJiroughoat the l.-st months of ISll, and tho sprl :d summer o
lei2. Enver Boy leading Turks and -ir;.;bs kept up ^ ; .^rrov/ing v;ar-
fare Y;hich sapped tho strength and grilled the nerves of the Italians
On Eovermber 27th and on March 3rd attempts v/ere m.ade to tahe Derna,
bot> of .. failed. Botv.ecn Ilovenber 2Gth and March 12tli attempts
\;oro made to retake Banghuzi, all resulting in more or 1- ss disastcr-
ous dcfea- for tho Arabs and xurlcs.^
tir:;G passed and the v/ar dragged, the Italian public becam;.
restless.*^ The army in Tripoli nov; settled do^n to a slow, meJ.odi-
cal penetration of the interior, which was proving costly, in spite
of the glowing report;: of the Italiar press corr c-sponden , .,nd noi
highly succesGfal. An Italian arm;; of si:!!:t2-one thousand men was
being employed and the cost of the war v/as grov/ing burdensome.
Gibbon's Eew lilap of j£urope, p.
I Lid, pp. 35-57.
Internationa.. Jood, 19" 1.

Indeed the war was becomin; a stalemate. xhe Italians Iield the
coast but were unable to conquer the interior. The original plan,
which ad cor, tor:ipl:;: : -'i V.:e surrender of t};.e vilaj/et as soon as the
coast OGcupied, h; d failed because of the stubborn resistance
of t] e Arabs of the co.inur;/. Unv/illing to risk confining the war
to Tripoli, Italian governnciit earl; iiv 1912 decided upwn ^
change in poiicy; in brief to earr^ tlie war into .isiatic and' Itoopean
xurlie;; in defiance of the protests of her allj- Austria."'"
On February E7tj: ar a feeler an Italian fleet bombarded Heirut
and sunli two Turhisi s ips in the roadstead. Prance, Russia and
Great Britain expressed concern, but too]^ no furtl .r action. On
-i^-ril IPth the I.aliar fie t bombardo., „-.ae Zale and Sed-el-u^r,
the mouth of the Dardanelles. The principal result of t • e actio..; was
the closure o:i Dardanelles by ^.irhs. The straits remained
cloc^r"
_
-o'^f
./ - -r- "^-opened
-a-j-. - combined prote;
.
nations. Daring the month of May tlie Italians tooh possession
of f c Dodecanese isl i . Aegean, cut a number 'of cablor' con-
necting European si a tic -urkey, and shelled of LoJ: -
itorranean ports, .^er actions in the Dodecanese v-.ere foreboding.
For iromediately upon occupation Italy an ounccc : she would retain
least H-odcL, .a... J:.h. c .. o..ld alt _ o goveri", f t],e
;::.er islands materially.
The sum::ier waL by no events of -o^rticular importanc
In Tripoli General Oaneva^ "..as making h..au i-....g... aa.VanceG i. .0
interior. The bloodiest Gngagem- nt was that fought at the oasis of
ziamzur. which ..as occupied only after a : ta:d fight.
_^
———. — -
Repington, London Times, April 5, 191^.
Ganeva :;g cor:r),andGr-in-cl:i sf of the Italians in Tripoli.
a
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2ur::ey Yias no\: beginning to feci the financial pressure of t] :
v.ar. X e ports of Chios, Miytiline, oi:iyru.a aixci outers i^ua - ..
ified in anticipation of an Italian attack, and the co st of the work
was c onsider.L.hle. A ne.. stri"- of railroad ad been laid, •'prolonging
Lo .-GclJoz lino in tjio direction of Llecca. ihese and the nomal ez-
pcnsos of ,.ar began to tell U]pon tlie misera,Ble Turkish finances.
As the year wore on unrest bof; n to seethe thro-aghout tr^e Em-oire,
In September 1911 v.: .'.en the v/ar begun uherc v/as in progress the anrraal
revolt in t'ho Yeman, and a serious uprising among the Catholic tribes
in Albania,''' t'-:G Malir^r-ori and the LCiridites. I'either of t]-.ose
rcvoi us .i^a uc^n tj.orougni^. crashed. The iilb;. -ribosnen had booi
forced to accept terms but v/holo sections of the country remained in
open revolt. The Yeman too v/as only half pciifierl
.
Lore serious than all hov/ever was the tro.iul loh began to
she its head in the Bai::.ans in t]'e early par^. of 1912. True to the
prop'. Gcies of tl. o Austria" s tho sound of cannon in t]-e Aegean stired
foreboding echoes in the Balkans. The Macedonians, "./;..o had been quie'
si-:ce 1908, began revolutionarj- agitation. Secret societies were
formed, riots too": place- at Ishkeb olsev/here, and rumors of a
4
-3alii:an leag^.e began to spri.ad.
The activitieo of t:h.o Italians in the Aegean and the rum lings
in the Balkans induced t - o Turks to begin peace negotiations, and on
July IBtih envoys \;ero sent t Ouchy to meet the Italians. The pour-
X
^liuial Register, 1911, jro. &60-56S.
2
Ibid.
/.
*
-annual Hegister, 1912, pp. o6Q-Z>6Z.

parlorc continued thoughout the summer without results. Italy would
taliG iiothinr: lesr. tha.'" the r ecognition oi' h -r cn e:-:ation of ?ri-ooli;
and Turkey s -iii i.o_^,.i^i^ -lor ju^r opean interve . -ion rc-fusec! to go t j
this limit.
Earl:,- in October, Italy began sending fe lers to lurho" sug'-oet-
ing a sot clement of the war upon indemnity basis. jIcxIlq- ho i. over
still refused to recognize the annezation of Tripoli. S^/ents' were
precipitated bj- the growing unrest in the Balhans. On October o ^"h
Montenegro declared war upon Turhey. Italy d ..- . c-ninea. to. force a
peace before the storm brohc, forwarded terms to t].-: Porte, and stated
at tho tir.e that unless the terms were acce-^ted wit^rin five days the
Italians would a..ach Surhoy in Europe. Simul Laneouciy oi-o Italian
fleet was order to prepare for action on the Aegean. The approaching
Balkan storm com.bineci with Italy's threat' to carr-- the war i'-to Turk-
ey left Turkey no choice bu':
. ma-:c peace. xkorefore on Oc -obor 15th
t' e treaty of Lausanne was signed a": Ouchy in Switzerland. The prin-
cipal provisions of the treaty provided at Turkey should -rrnt com-
plete autonomy to Tripoli, trie Sulta:., rcsii.ning in off c-c . of .emiioral
sovereignty. lie v/as permit cod to maintain his position as the head of
the Kohammedan religion in Tri-ooli. Italy was to continue in occupa-
-i • of w„.o Dodecanese islands un wii Turkish resistance to Italian
Occupation in Tripoli had ceased. By this rather ambigious arrange-
ment Turkey was not r^r iiroci to recognize formally the Italian con-
qaes u of Tripoli , ..aid wat able to save a renne-- w of her honor. ''^ T„e
treaiiy of Lausanaie concluded the Turc o-Italian war, a war which in
^ Annual Register, 1912, p. S62.
^ ^fallace. Great o.;- Italy, p. 135.
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many tqsvqozs lad never been a war and yet which had In effect ^iven
rise uo tl: chain of events \7hich brour;ht the r^ations of the v.orld
into tho conflict of 1914-1919. Vlllari v/ritinc in the Fortnightly
:^evie\. for November 1915 says, "Indirectly it (the Libyan v/ar) chang-
Gc; the v.hole course of Jiuropean ^.isuory by its influence upon the
affairs of the Bear East", and in the light of lat er events that
influence nay be .said to have extended to the entire •.•.orld. .I'ot too
r:m :;h emphasis can bo placed upon the tremendous significance of the
i^iuyan war and its effects upon the later trend of events, not onlj
in precipitating the Balkan ..ars, but in severing t^ - ties, practical
and sentimental (if any such ever exiSoed) v/hich iieid the Triple Al-
liance together. The war revealed to all, and most important of all
to Lhc Salhan statec the weakness of the Turkish empire.''' It be;,an
ane.. the disintegratioii of the decadent fabric of the Ottoman state,
and opened the way for the Balkan states to emulate Italy in her
polic;; of open aggrandizment . .
Tho attitude of the nations of Europe tov.ard the war was almost
solidl:; antagonistic. Tho press of Europe stormed Italy ,.it]-. invect-
ive during tho e^rly part of the -.var. Only Russia maintained a
friendl;; attitude to.,ard Italy, an attitude which is easily understooc
when Russia's traditional hostility, toward Turkey is taken into co._-
siderationr
-it the same ti;..e Russia's stand was neutral, and she had at hear'
tho peace a::d safety of Europe. Tliree times M. ^azonoff. Minister
of Forci;;n Affairs, in Do:- ember 1911, in February 1912, and in July
191^;, submitted to the Powers notes suggesting steps to stop .the vvar.
haLcn, Modern European History, p. 160.
2
/ill.rri, Ital" after the . ibyan i'far. Fortnightly Hevie,, ,v. 100,943
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However, the Pov/ors ..ere unable to accetpt o. o x^uscian proposals or uo
agree uijon a similar course of action, and nothing was done."'"
France, durinc the early period of the war remained friendly
toward Italj-. 2he French regarded Italian occupabion of Tripoli ar
the natural corollary of t}ieir establishnent in Morocco. Since lt02
'..hen the t-..o countries signed the protocol defiy:inr: their respective
rig}i'i;s in I'orth Africa the French had been accustonecL to regard Trip-
oli as an Italian colony in the same way that they loolied upon Lloroccc
as a province
.
belonged to France. Hence v;her. Italy tooh posses-
sion of Tripoli in 1-:;01 the act occasioned none of *thc frenzied de-
2nounciauions that emanated from the other European countries. Only
the indiscretion of the Italians in stop-^i^-f^French mail stcners in
the latter part of 1911 ..^roiled the ...o jan^ries in difficulties
whlc hept them apart when they might have drifted together.
The radical stand tahen by t>e British on the war is inexplicable
without comprehension of the obtacGxiess and inc_onsistcincies of the
British mind. Doubtles;. too the British feared t};,e substitution of
the vigorous and energetic Italian pov. er iii Tripoli for the decadent
sway of the Porte. Italy controlling the haroors of Tripoli night
at some time come to be a dominating power in the Mediterranean and
throw a barrier across the route to India, the heart and ceiiter of the
3r i t i sh emp 1 r e
.
T:_e ethics of Italy's attach: upon T.irliey have been much criticise,
by \.ri oers of all nation;.,. It lias been characterized h-^ a number of
unpleasant names and incongruously enough, in most cases men whose
native lands have not been entirely clear of the stigma of similar
T_ Dillon, Ruscia's Persistant Efforts to Stop the ^''ar. Fortnightly
Heviev;, Vol. 100, p 94S. Ibid.
I
I
acts. ::ov;evcr, t]:G opinion of the more stable oindecl and non-biased
men seems to be that v/hile unjustified from a purel^^ ethical stand,
"Ital^^ acted in September 1911 from those inperativ: material consid-
erations which compelled jingland herself 'co ac . in oouzi. .-.frica to-
1
ward the close of 1099", and in accord v/ith the contemporary polit-
ical standards and practices of nations. Giolit::i specking at ^urin
in Oc-ojor 1911 gives ^ resume of It^l. 's actions and motives, and
gives logical justification upon such grounds, he calls attention
to the fact that Ital- acted in 1911 no diff orently f-an England,
(J jrmany or Paisf.ia v;ould have done in. similar circum£t<;aices. xHid. p/hen
the historian of anoth-r daj-, removed from the bias of the times,
v;rioe£ the story of the Libyan ;7ar it ..ill be v;it-. those facts in
mind and Italy v/ill bo Judged thereby.'"'
^
-hiell of the Triple ^illiance, Livii-
-go. Vol. 2.1, p. 707.
^ Giolit.i's Speech at Turin, Rovie.. of fieviews. Vol. 4:, p-). 97-98.
Sarclay, Turco-Italian War and its Problems, p. 12.
If
Ohaptor III
?he Passin£; of t}:.e Triple Alliance
While- tho 'Turoo-Italian war had many far reaching effects, some
of whic^- as abovo ^loto set the fuse to the world conflagratiorj of
1914—1918, none v.-'^-'''^ more signific:.;nt than tl s tremendous "bearing;; it-
had upon tlie int .rrolations of the nal:ions of the Triple iilliaree.
The Triple Alliance betvvecn GerDan7, Austria, anc Italy Y/as upon
the Italian, side at least the product of the political atmosphere anc"
inoGi-nauional coaplioations of the ti..;es, an allianc e rather of ex-
pediency than of friendshi-n or comr-ion interests. Then Italy attained
unification o.;"d he^an to take stecli of position among the po\';ers she
found her sell' imiiaturo i:nd isolated. '2o the central po\/er£ Italy
offered valuable possibilities as an ally. Bismarck and the states-
m.C2i of central 3uro-r;'G looking into th? future found a fair dream in
the vision of Italy and Austria contro.li i.; the Mediterranean and
throvring a barrier across the path to India. TlTith this as one of the
ends in viev; Bismarck carefully manipulated interna !:ional diplomacy
to brinfj Italy into alliance v;ith Germany and Austria. First France
v;as encoura{^ed to annex Tuni-
,
and then Italy was assured that Tunis
and the empire of the H-.ciiterranean should b: hers. And Ital^- under
the influence of h r p^st and the urge of her present necessities
came to regard Tunis as her terra prom.isc.a. Then came the Fronc:
annexation of t- e country in 18^^!' v.lt": its bitter disappoi:itment
and keen resentment. Italy folt that she had been deprived of tha-
vvhich was hers by the "right of history, geography and necessity".
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ThG aninositv occasioned that act is -.tgII Irnoun. Indicnation in
Italy rose to such a pitch that the Gairoli cabinet was forced to ro-
slQn on Ila^- 14, 1081. At Marseilles Froncli troops roturning from
Tunis v.erG hissed and there 7/j.b rioting betY/ecn the French and It-1-
ians. The v;avG of indignation that sv;cpt Italy made impost:.: ble for
t'iic time any alliance betv/een Prance and Italy, and a. the same time
\;as the direct cause of Italy* s connection with the Triple Alliance.
From. tl'G very first, however, there -.vas considerable rancor be-
tween Italy and her enemy-ally A .stria. The Central Powers treated
Italy with scant respect at times and notes of discord v;ere not un-
so nded oven in the early days of the Alliance. Indcd when the time
camo for the first ronewal of the Alliance, public opinion in Italy
\.as solidly against its continuation. In 18G6 Count di P.obilant, I!in.
ister of Foreign Affaire, writing the Italian ambassador in Berlin
said, "Decidedly Italy is tired of tj-is sterile alliance, and I do
not feel desirous of forcing her to rene.. it because I feel too deep-
ly that it will al'.ays be unproductive for us. It is probable that
do Bismarck has make a mistake regarding m; c If, not knowing m.e
at all and imagines that I ..ill follow hir lead always .and in spite
of ever:; .v.ing. If ho thought that he is m.istaken. It i s therefore
m.ore. than probable ^that I will -not reiae\. the alliance". That Italy
did renc. the Alliance, in 1886 was due' to tl.:. temporary eclipse oi.
Italic'-n prostige by the dofeat at Dogali and t: e fear of isolation
sii.GG s]-w ..as still on unfriendly terms >.ith Franco.
During the second decade of. the ^^-liance Orispi, staunch friend
of Germany, welded the Alliance solid for tlic time being, he drev,
t].c strings together, thrusting into the shadoi- the difficuluies be-
tween Italy and Austria, and magnifying the political value of t^^e Al.
II
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liance to It^.l:?; and at tlr. same time lie pushed Franco still farther
a,, ay. Tlien came the disaster of Adov/a, and with it Orispi's ruiil, an(
the sudden eclipse of his political policies. '^Ith Grispi's passing-
passed also the palmy days of the. Triple Alliance.
"The first decade of the twentieth century abounds in the e:zGhang
of G^ricvances between Austria and Italy. Tith no strong supporter
of ti c Lriplc Alliance in pov/er, difficulties, following the 'natural
CO rse of events, multiplied. The raison d' etre of t:\e ^'riple iC-
liancc v/as vranning, and the unique situation of the natural encnieL,
Austria and Italy, al .ied, began to bear fruit. ITotable among the
events manifesting the dissonanco within the alliance was the sharp
protest fron .iustri:.. ./ _ : . visi...: Italy in 1907.
Tlie •probable future rupture in the Triple Alliance was now for-
seen by both Italy and Austria; and both 'began and car ied throu-h
preparations aloi:^ /. .olr borders. '^^ . .
. mbcr of roads wore built
frontiers strengthened. For example during the years 1905-6 Italy
builu railro.:ds to t}.e linos of defer co behind the Tagiamento ano
A
Jronta river-. The ll/:...i,
-.f . - .r'-;
.
, ^s .ice and Piavc were
strengthened, and roads built beidnd "ihem.
Austria too carried Lhrough a number of important fortifications
on the Italian frontier. "IProm Kreutzberg to Switzcrl.a;d o linos
\.ere fortified . and put in order"." Frequent military maneuvers were
held along the borders and \.ero discussed freely b;. the press of
i-iuro-oe.
~
^ Wallace, Greater It.,ly,
. 107.
2 Hepington, Austria and Italy, Living Ago," Vol. 266, P. 587.
^ Ibid. p. S9"l.
Ibid. S8 7.
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_
lor did the rapproacLment "betv/Qen Franco and Italy in 1901 tend
to inspire Gorman^ ..mstria with confidence in their ally, and
vthen at the Conference of Algeciras .in accordance v.ith that agreement
the Italian delegate voted with the French and English, the^- were
further irritated. I._.j.,; accused of infidelity to t}:e 'triple
Alliar.co and a number of diplon-tic visit r. v/ero necessary before the
affair v. as finally laid away."^
Again in 1908 the annexa'-: of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an actio]
taken .vithout the knowledge or co:isent of Italy, and one which in-
dubitably disturbocl the 3a"-::.an statns qio and for tliat reason was in
violation of Article Sovon of t];.- triple Alliance treaty, roused deop
indignation in Italy. 'The Austrian Embassy was assaulted, its win-
dovvS broken and popular censure expressed in th-: Chamber, .'aid yet
Austria and Italy '.rero allies.
•These differences and numerous others of a simil ..r nature accum-
ulating through the years had sown the seeds of decay ;;ithin the Trip-
le Alliance. Then camo uh- ^iu;
. . r , t apogee of the summar-
ized grievances of three decades, and adding to then a host of new
and yet more vital troubles. It war. the .final strtv,,
.
InThen Italy embarked upon the conquest of Tripoli in So-otomber
1911 s'le naturall;;- expected sympathy or a t le.^s'>: a bonevolGn- noutral-
ity from her allies, Germany and Austria. What actually happened wa£
1 rr
'Tallico Greater Italy, p. lOS.
2
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.he exiioz roversG of thie. Insto d of sympathy her hardest criticism
G.:.-c _ron those counorie:,
, u fact w-ica. tli're?/ her unnatural alliance
v;iti. the Central Powers in a lurid lir;ht. The war througl-out its en-
tiro course, from t>G dis-atc^- of the ultima . . Jurhey to ' h
.. ^.e..o^
of Lausanne, was the sourc o -f continual irritation within the triple
.^liance, and stir eel deeper feelings of resentment which were not to
be af:^':''^t-cl by dirolomatic visits or fine phrases.
-::7onuC in con.-isc cion witl: o .. ar which macie impossible i
future any real union between the members :? the i'riple .illiance ma
bo roughly rrou-Gc! in three catagories; (1) Austro-Italian rolatior.;.
durinf: ,ar, ..i., major emphasis upon the attempts of Austria jo
lim.it t. Italian sphere of operations; (2) German- Italian relations
daring the war, in particular tl o effects of the war -upon the German
p:>lici0s in t: o Sear and the G-erman reactions thereto; (5) the
change in Italy's pol-ltical situation resulting from war, and the
'
incompatibility between he:- aspirations and her position as an ally
of Gerna-iy and Aus'uro--^ungary.
From .he beginning Austria manifested in a number of ways an an-
tagonism toward Italy's attach upon Turkey. That in part her attitude
was due to ^ si'.ccre apwrohension lest the Y/ar woiild lead to a Balkan
eruption and a general war we may not doubt. But v/hatever her motive
her attitude produced a decided dudg-Cn in Italy. or
-orsistant ei-
-orts to li.^r:
. 3 sphere of operations to the African theatre, despi
•he turn that affairs took for Italy, left tl e I'jalians v^ith a very
^ J r t as 1 f th oi r all i « s
.
At the beginning Aus.uria placed sharp limitations upon the &tql
of the war, demanding that Italy restric it to Tripoli and that no

I ^1 i
action be ta::Gn v;"..ic}:c might snclanger the status quo Ir, jhe Balkans."^
On Septenbor 26 1911 Count Aehr o-t-^al , Austriar Minister for Foreifn
i.ffairs, ir.inodiatoly upon boin- inforrnocl of Ital:-'s contemplated ac-
tion tov;ard Turkey, instructed Baron Ambrozy, Austrian Ambassador to
Ror.c, that tho Karchese di San Griuliano haa in a -^-^roviouc convorsatior
••"i -- ''- 'CL t:.a u should I taly and -urkoy go to ..ar over -ripolj
operations would bo limited to the Mediterranean coasts of Africa and
that Austria ttouIcI hold Italj- to ':;' ir- a'-reoment. Earl3^ in October
Baron Grautsc?., spcaliin- in the Aus-riar. ohambor dv/e.lt at lengtj: upon
t]_e importancG to Austria of t:.e limitation of hostiliuios. . o said,
"It is self oYiaent that in vi-^v; of its ^^roat interest in t]x- Adriatic
and adjacent w^ikan counwrics -he iius tr o-Lungar iar. state is bou.id to
ut'5-ach main importanc e . to the limitation of t]:e theater of hostilitiel .
Later spcalcin- of Italy ho asserted t:. at 'Italy '.ad covenanted to ezclud
from miliu^r^ or naval operations tho xurhish coast of t -muriatic
;^.d Ionian seas. He ended his spo ith the significant remark tha
Austria-Hungary would adO'"';^t whatever mcjr .res ma^/ b-: necos^:ar3^ to
protect Austro-hungari^n commercial in«crcLuS sh.ould thoy appear to be
menacod by the present situation.^
Shat Italy however formally admitted the Austrian ri;" ,; to demand
restriction on operations, or that she ever agreed definitely to
limit them is denied by the Italians. For on October 21st upon the
farther dem.ahds of the Austrian foreign office that Itulv ar-reo to
1 Billon, He.. Sines, ?Te.. Gases, Contemporary nevic v; , Yol. 101, p. 72C
-Austrian -.-^ Booh, ...o.2, .appendix IIo. 3, Scott Edition ,2 ,-^p. 5:o7-8.
London Times, April 25th 1911, 5a.
- Ibid.
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confine uO Y;ar to the Africa:^ littoral a:acl interior Von I.Ierc--'^ ^iist-
rian ArnLassador J0-.10, sent to Count
-:>.ehr enthal the follov.'ing mess-
age, "7/e have just reeeivod the following reply from the Foreign Min-
ister to n:; latest repr r^sentatior. , "^Te have alv.a;.~s reserved our fre -don
01 niilitar7 operations outside of the Turkish coaso in the Adriatic
and Ionian seas. We should be delighted if v-.e should not bo oonpellecl
to talie advantai^:;e 01 that freedom, bu. nevertheless v;e rncoiyo it
in its entire Jy. ""-^ i.ero already was a striking illustration of the
spirit in vi'hich the Austrian attenps to regulate the -..ar were accepted
a spirit out of v;hieh- it ..as inevitable that there should arise still
greater f-ic Jion DCo.,eon t]jo allies. ^le friction did continue and
as the war progressed the diplomatic controversy over tlie right to
extend operations wa^-ied hotter and hotter.
In a let: or of instruction to Von Mprey on liovenber 6th Count
tiehrcnt" al described an interviev, between the Duhe of Avarna and hin-
sel:.
,
u lon tho subject of war o-oorations in the A;ogean, v.hero it had
been reported th^t Italian ..arships were crusing off Salonihi. Tlie
Duke ei.r:: .ically denied the report. Go;.:nt Aehrenthal pointed out
that owing to the unrof.t in th'3 Balkans any military operations in or
ibout the peninsula were likely to result in the disruption of the
Balkan status quo guaranteed under ^irticlo Seven of tl
.
triple Alliance 'Tr- t-.^ I'h c Duke of Avarna en asked w? other th c
occupation of son of the Aegean islands v. ould bo in violauion of th :j
treaty. Count .-lehr enthal assured him that any such action would be
regarded so by Austria.*^ 'The ne::t day, fearing that the Italians
^ Austrian 2ocl Book To. 2, Apriondls 4; Scott .Edition, Vol. 2, p. 539
iiee belov; Appendix 1.
-
-strian Reel Book, IIo.E, Appendix 4, Scott Edition, Vol. 2, p. 3S9
(r
conoernplauc.
. bornbardinent of ports in Suropoari SurlcGj', Goiint x^oh-
rentLal informed tho Italian ambassador offioiall:; tj-.a'. the bonb .rd-
nent of an;/ of tho Turkish ports would bo in violation of .irticle 3ov-
Qu of the -riple ..lliane : Treaty.
On Eov ember 15th Count Aehrenthal again \Yiring instructions to
Von liercy doscribes another interviev/ bet\7een the Dulro of Avarna and
hiLieelf, occat: ioned b^^ the reception of a tologram from the. Harchese
di 3an Guiliano suggesting the extension of operations to tho Aegean.
GoLint xiehrenthal took a decided stand, refusing to discuss the matter
furth:;r, and sa^^ing ...a- to do so .;Ould be :o accept a portion of Ita:|
rctponsibilitT/ should she tal^e such action.
Tliroughout tho remainder of 1911 t]:C c ontrovcrs ey between the
Austrian anO Italia.- foreign offices continued grc.ing more bitter c-,
Italy became mor3 and m.ore involved in the war. Time and again t" e
Italian ambassador approached Count Aehrenthal upon the subject of t]:c
extension of hostilities, and eac: tim: v.as met with the same uneqv.iv-
ocal attitud':. Italy now determined to appeal to her other ally,
'ermany, hop ing to find in her a friend whose influence might be nsec
to sha-.o posit i .:' Austria. ::o>.ovor here again her offor '^l crc
met and blocked by Austria. On T.^ov ember 29 th Count Aehrenthal becom-
ing cognizant of Italy's intention sent instruction to Go:int Szogyney
jrian ^jnbassador to G-erma
,
pressing himself as strongly opposec
to Italy's purpose, intimatiiig of course that the Count should use
;;is influence against It in Berlin.
1
Times history. Vol. 5 p. 10.
^ Austrian Red Book, Appendix Eo 5, Scott Edition, Vol £, 540
Ibid, 341.
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Meantime the v.ar drasgecl and. Italy c?:a:^Gd under restraint. The
prolongation of operations in Tripoli set up a violent desire in
Italy for ertonsion of liostilitiefj alon.;:; the Turliish coas': and in -Al-
bania."'' At the tine of Italj^'s descent upon Tripoli the Italians did
not rcalizo the results of the war upon Italy if prolonged. Such a
contingcnoy had not been oonsider-jcl likol^v They had expected tlie
Turlis to acquiesoo after a ..rief display of force, nego-^iati-ons to
ensue and the Bosnia Ilerzegovi.na fiasco to be duplicated with Trip-
oltania and Gyrenaica as its subjects. T-o -r.tire affair would oe
coi^cluded in a fev. weeks or months at the mosu. By the beginning of
1912 Italy had been economically prosperous. Her finances v/ere or-
derly; fjj?. rente was above par; tjie lira .'vas higl er t] an usual; pub-
lic credit was good and the country v.afc: generally in easy circun-
stances.
The continuation of the \;ar reversed all this. The lira deprec-
iated in value. The market wat flooded v/ith securities. Prices fell
over the entire country and general economic depression set in. The
Turkish empire had been the principal mart for It^ilian dr , and a
prohibitive duty placed on goods destined for any paru oi ^ur:.:ey crip,
pled It.lian industry and threv/ thousand of Italian laborers out of
T.ork."^ The country was thronged ..ith unemploj/ed, many In actual
destitution. Commerce v/as seriously impaireci and the seaport towns
were filled with the unemp'J.o ; -od who had been left idle by the stagan-
ation of commerce. Added to these were the hoards of Italian refuge,
expelled from Turkey by Talaat Bey. homeless and succorless and
1 Annual Register, 111---.
- Dillon, War is Coming to an End, Contemporary Reviev. , v.
102, p 11
- loid.
' Kepi, Italians at Tripoli, .-living -igo, vQ^- ^'^^> ' ^
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a.-cl suiiiorinc they thronged, the seaports, or v/andered over the oov.n-
try gaining subsistaisc e by such means as they might.
'2]io actual cost of th^ war v;as becoming burdensome, having mount-
ed to the sum 1,500,000 per day. ^ Sy May 1st the total cost reached
25^,000,000 lire v/ith prospects of increasing expense. A further
fact to be considered -..as the deterioration in vTar materials, such a;
artillery, field equipment, etc. Practically the entire Italian navy
ijad been in the water for several months and needed dry -dock badly.
The stresr: of t- '-se conditions, the general disorder, economic
depression, and .he sombre prospects for t}.c future vfealiened the mor-
al of t: c nation. Discontent was. rifs ever^^vhere and among all
cLiSset. ihere v/l.e an evergrov/ing sentiment for the cor.clusion of
t".
-./^r and for taking v/hatever steps were necci.sary to uliat end. And
yet Austria, Italy's ally, said"no" to the only effective means that
Italy had for bringing Turkey to terms. It ...c u. matter of life and
death to many of the Italian people th a « Italy s- ould carry operation
into theatres \.',ere Turkey could be made to feel .- the pressure of trie
v;ar, ar.d to c e do Tripolitana and Cyrenaica .(since Italy's action in
annexing tjiose provinc es had •rocluded any otlier setolement consist-
ant with her honor.) This condition of affairs inflamed public op-
ij.ion ±r. It...ly and influenced even those who for one reason or anoth-
er ] ad been favorable inclined tov.ard the Triple" alliance.
During- the first months of 1912 the pressure from within bec<-.me
so great that t^ o Italian government, determined to extend military
and naval operations in spite of the protests of Austria. In ffebruar '
the bombardment of Beirut occasioned a warning protest from Vionns,
Dillon, ar is Coming to an xCnd, Contemporary Review, Vjo1.E,p 117
^ Wallace, Greater Italy, v. 128
loicU

and durini-j; the f .aio^^inc months as Italy proceeded to carrj^ the v;ar
home to Turkey in open dcfiar.co of Austria, .he tvvo comuries v;ero
not far fron a-tual v;ar. aho closure of the Dardanelles occasioned
by the Italian bombardment Kun Kale and Sed- el-Bar in April, caused
a considerable tremor throughout all of Euro-^o a:-fl a series of -oro-
tests fron ^ustria -:o Italy. It w^le a': u..is jane ".are that the .ius-
trians v/ent so far as to threaten I-:aly with the actual aoror-ation oi
the triple Alliance. On that ocoasio:: GoM:it B^::-' told informed tlic
Duhe of Avarna in plain -crus
. "if
-.x- lioyal Italian Government
desired to recover its liberty of action the Imperial and Royal Gov-
crncient could do the same", but he (Bcrchtolrl) could not admit- that
vve should in the. future ur.dert_.::o sinila:.' operations or any action
whatever that should be opposed to the point of viev. manifested in
the preceding conferences. Should any sue?: o-o 'ation be undertaken
by us it mir:h. bo atuemded by grave c ^i.sequenc .s.
^
!he occupation of the Dodecanese during the l,:.tt®r part of A-nril
and May was t', -, occasion of furt? r heated controversy. Count 3erc'
-
told in a letter of instructionc to Von Merey wrote, "The question
of occupation of islands in tlie Aegean has repeatedly been the sub-
ject of conversation bet-.een me and t}ic It';'.llan ambassador in th
last fev; days", .^e continues saying that uiustria was and ever would
be thoroughly opposed. The Duhe of Avarna replied that he .as very
apprehensive lest the antagonistic attitude taken by .iustria should
arouse citier rosenLment in Italy, he oiiplained that i 'a impressed
Italy strangely to sec of all Europe including Germany, that it ..tiE
.uistria-Hungary, Italy's ally, who caused Italy greatest difficulty
1
.
Itctlian Green Booh Ho. G, Seott Edition, pp. 1215-lG.
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in the atuainrneiit of her aim. Oount Berchtold replied that Austria
'.;as in a difficult position and tj.a. in the opinion of the Austrians
the occupations in question (of the Dodocar.esG) v;as contrary' to
article 3eve:.i of tlic I'ripls Alliance treaty, which gives to Austria
tie rifjht to demand compensation. For tl
.
time Austria v/o .ild malte no
such demands hut .. Id hold tlie rig: _ t ahe-r-^-t - . Oount Berchtolc:.
ezpressed himself as very doubtful regardir;, result of the occup-
ation of th® islands, and pointed out that Austria had been opposed
to r:;iG' aetior, from t}:o beginniii^ „.id for cover consequences or,--
1
sued Italy would be entirely responsible. Thus Austria steadily re-
^
^used Italy's right to ajtack Turhey an tl^e mainland or in the Aegean.
L: ':-: in April 1D12 . D:v-u of Avarna again approached Coun
Ber .htold in an effort to procure Austria's consent to further attack
upon Turkey he i.'as flatly refused. During the following sum-r.i©r month
GUDjoct discussed o Foreign Offices of the t^.o countries
but always v\ith the same results, Austria stubbornly adhering to the
...
2
opposition.
C-err.ian realize-.. danger in th e situation and made attem-s
ut conciliation. The jB.uporor paid a visit to the IZing at Venice but
OT/ing . to his position as an ally of Italy and the protector of Turkey
1-^ '30uld acconplish very little, lifter t/e Emperor's visit Eiderleji-
/.accf-.terproceeded to Rome v.iiero he conferred w'ith G-iolitti, the Mar-
ohese di Oo.n Guiliano and Tic tor Emmanuel :.ut ho too ^vas boimd by
r:
jcrmany's 'oolitical situation. But ha" it not be::n for German;-'
s
1
Austrian 3ed Book Eo, E Appsncix IS, Scot«; i::dition. Vol 2, p. 345.
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Aniiual Register 1912, -o;. 509-511.

singular r^ofsition v.'ith refGronc'S to Tiirlza:/ e.nd. It ly it is to ,og
doubt ou
-1-0-' -...0 effort;: of Emperor or iCiderj.Qa-'^aeGhter would
Jiavc avaiiGd to smoo.th the differenGos between Austria and Italy,
cliffor enc Of.
. roiisoc^ s-ch animosity? among the Italian r-g )-pio
-1-c ao uion -„I.q.i b;' t].. -iustrian stw.to in attempting to limit
..ar operations i ite of tl:o drastie need of Ital;:, roused feeling
onou;;]:
,
but t^'is ir itation v;aG further stro."'^:' t-r^-?^"^. h- f-e attitude
of tl:o ^.uotriari people in general. j" ? Austrian prosL v;as almost
solidly antagonistic, and shov/ecl evo: a leaning tov. . irliey. A sum-
mary of the ^ress accounts including those of ITou-; Fro-- Press and oth
or pror-iinent journalf^: • :;^vory little sympathy for uho ally Italy,
and a rather friendly attitude tou'ard TurJiey. For example the fir .
at the oasis on So-tomber 23rd- SGth , t:'- th -:• Italians stood t: oir
•;:round
-;g;:.inst suca l.eavy odd 9, is cl.arac worized as an "Italian retrea
and as an "Italian mishap". Misleading and malicious remarks upon
/ osition of ta.o Italians in Tripoli v;oro fro^-uc^t , and th cir su.<»-
3CS£,cs vvero doscribod (if at alii as of lit'.le ioportanc o. Jhe •^'''SiG
post went so far as to criticize Count Achrenthal for taking to:
friendly an attitude tovard Italy, .. / called for a fimer, more-
aggressive policy directed against Italy, \7ho was disturbing Austrian
Interests in the Mediterranean. Ee (Count Aehrenthal) was severly
rated for not rnor-^- closel;.
,..
...rdin'' fs-or.n aistrian interests in t^-'
Ballauis, and for alloaing Aus t r -Lungar ian consulates 'CO take char^
p
of Italian interests in the Turkish empire." These remarks v; -
characteristic of the general ^^-od hostility of th-.: .lustrian
X
L on don Tim e ; October 30th , 5c •
iiondon Times, October ISth, 5g.

1
or ess.
Uanj of
.
.s-trian officials too!i a very radical stand tov.ards
Ital-. .i s-cronr; anti-Italian party developed in Vienna which assertec
.11 no u varnished terns that the moment to strike Italy had come,
-"lis faction was led by the Austrian Chief of Son oral Staff, Baron
Conrad von Hotzondorf. Considerable agitation .as aroused by the pari
and it went so far as to have certain fortific--ions erected alon{^
o.. c Italian border, its activities becominc so pronounced that the
Government was compelled to ash i3..ron Conrad V)n Eotsendorf to resign,
out at that time the damage had been done.^
Italy of course reacted strongly to what she re£ardod as Austria'
unfriendly policies. These policies and the decided Bon.imentc of the
j^us'orian people could not fail to have their repurcus;:ion in Italy.
E ezpresEcd by the Duke of Avarna to the Austrian Foreir^n Minister
It„l,y G:„.. in -iustria her worst enemy, .^er m.oct vital policies wer-:
:..lockcd and obr. true ted in every way poseiblo by Austria; one of her
"ardest criti cs .vas Austria; and the entire Austrian nation seamed
'CO be out of s„. :
: ,.ith Italy.
'J^he effects of all this upon the Italian people were evinced in
r:
u number of ways. Irredentism flamed in Yenetia and the Trsntino.''
.ustrian travelers were fr3quently attacked and violated. A particu-
lar instance took place at Udini where a mob set upon and seriously
/I
injurer a number of .lustrians. ~ At Tr1 -.ste
,
at Riva and around Lago
c.i G-arda an oi-^ustrain societies were formed and displayed openly
'allacG, Greater lualy, p. 12u.
Ibid. p. 146.
Annual Hegister, 1912, p-^. 309-216.
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anti-Aiistrian feelings.
^hilG tho major rif-^u in l^.c iriplo Alliance created bj^ the
L%lDiran war wore tliose^ between Austria and Italy, the. war occasioned
conflicts of interest between Italy and German:/ v.'-ich if loss obviou
were only second in inport.nc e , and combined wi'^v the ^.ustro-1 :alian
quarrels went far to strengthen the barrier between Italy and her
allies.
2he paramount difficaluy between Germany and Italy was the effcc
which Italy's descent upon Tripoli had upon the carefully laid plans
of the Germans in the Hear East, and the reaction of - "T-ir" s "lo v^r
Germany because of war.
For years prior z.o 1911 Germany had been carefully we^^ving a web
of diplomacy about the Turh. Ee had boon asrured that Germany vm.s
his best friend who would protect l.im in -.imo of need, who would care
for the solidarity of his moribund empire, and preven. foreign ac,gres
2
sion.
-md it vius upon these plans in : 'car xiast that urormany haC
been reconstructing her foreign policy. For two decades prior to 191
Germany had be n doinp; 'an about f^?.oo from the Baltic to t}- TJoditer-
r...nean and her Constantinople, i..orocco and ^sia^ic activiuieL, „ero
e^cpressions of this movement. As one phase of this movement Germany
contemplated a Turco-Italian co^itrol of t'- • Mediterranean, a vital
dLj.. to England co>:norcially and colon iuily. For years tho solidar-
it- jf the Turkish Triple Alliance combination, .1. this naval dom-
^ Annual Register, 1912, pp. S09-S16.
^ Times history, vol. 5, p. 99.
^ Lon^, Germany's I.'caite:.r_ . .-.©ague, Fortnightlr Hevic;v,96: 895

industriouslv fosterod; Austri d been nursed as naval
powere and ant 'Lronism botv/eon It:.!:; e-~d ?-Tr!:c:- l-.ad been snooi' -: ^-cl
ov..,-:^ ^ .1. L>^.:io close!;-' allied polic
insidious attempts had been made uO di to islol. assia,
and to GO'^vl:;ce It.:l
. intir.ir.c:/ be. . En^;:-
o
Under these cireumstanc es Ital^ could have taken no step v/hicl
would bavo be on more of a blov; to t>oso carefully laid (r ornan7 ^^Irrs
t' her Lib^c.^- drove a co.^C'i and four throagh Gcri.i;„n
for eign policic
,
d she sav; crunbling to duct her plans for Medit-
erranean control. T e network uMch had been so 1? '.orloupV^ or
about "T" '- 07 so ' uO bo well on the wa, to ucs «ruc '^i Ji: , unc .rernan
ambitions wcro del: a blow from v;hi' might recover. Her posi-
tion was indeed a most ©nbarasr-in" one and we na:» f•tiers tor'tur es
'^oii "Xiderl^a-'Taiichter as hj uosced upon hia cr:inpled pillo:.
marveling upon the course of h events. 2o thinl: that his frolic
at Age.dir should have brought u^von hi-: the --^orversio;- of Gorman:/','.
ciS-.j-L
-1 j.^:. L.c„LiQL. Indeed placed i-. y .rv uiip.c.
position c; .cl Ijy while her ally , violated the integrity
f t ii G 'J t . man em"?:ire.
ihe 'Jripolitan affair toil ov/ing as It did- fast af -er the Bosnia-
Herzegovina- annexation, disillusioned Turkey and made her distrustful
of her g0':>r! friend Gornai^.y, who in s^^it : 01 ]ior asrura:ne oif;* -rot' ct
Ing po..cr friendship :..ice v/it^.ir :i'0 period O-' three -^'q^tz
stood aulGtlv bv while first one and", tli-en the. othjsr inember '--of "th.o
,9G: 875.
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I'riplo Alliance out off portions of the Ottoman state. It . il.;
in the natural cours: .... ovont. ,.t Ger;.L..^ should feci geniuno ro-
sontment tov/ard hor ally who seemed so recliless of Gorman plans when
they chanced to conflict v/ith her ov.Ti ambitions.
The clissensi;ns botv/Gon Austria and Ital^^ brouf;;ht by the war
threatened again GrGrm.any's international schemec: . or policy ever
si.-.cG J e formation of the Triple Alliance had been to mitigate tho
differences betweon Austria ai d Italy, and her efforl:;; had borno some
fruits. Prior to the war the Austro-Italian rift had at least not
^;rovai out of bounds. Hov/cver the war changed all this, and Germany
more involved, closer to tlic inner workings of the Alliance perceived
that the damage done between Italy and Austria v/as v/ell nigh irrepair
aule. Small wonder thon that '..•-©rmany felt t':at the collapse
foreign policy could bo directly attributoc the Tripolitan raic.
of her ally, Italy, that she had a good cause to be righteously in-
dignant to..,j.rdG Italy yrtios® acts had ...rought shad07/s over ::or cjicr-
ished schemes:
.
2he war and its results brought to a head a sentiment that had
been latent in Germany for some time, namely the idso that after all
:rurkey would mahe a bette- ally than Italy. An Allianc o" wlt^^ ^urkey -
ever appealed to German ..riters, and v.ith the possibilitiec oi a
2
strong Turkish fleet the v^ttraction grew a-na.'^o, Italy was and had
al"..ays been recognized a, ' weal: mem.be:-' / .riple Alliance, and
could bo relied upon in a land v/ar only, an^; not then should
emy c. ancc to be England.'" There Was in some quarters a definite
Lon-
,
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dosire to replac Italy by Turkey in the Alliancs. This sentiment
vvas exprGSSGcl. by many writers and in some- quarters - > prosF:.'^
Naturally such c^. ..ttitude did not tend to dor^r oar o Germany ' s
bitterness against Italy for her attack on Tripoli. Ge.'many lierseli
i-vas beginning to dovelopo comercial interests in Tripoli, and to sec-
retly obstruct Itc.l,;'s schcmGE there when pos. ible,'^and as demonstrate
ed tines v. it riout ' number in modern colonial history commercial inter GS'jjs
are tlie :^relude to 'jIjc acquisition of a nev; colony/. Germany at least
esipected to occup;/ Toburl. a naval base, ^, _...ct .. ic-- illuminates
It..l;;'s hasty seizure of the place at the beginning of the war, and
had it not been T;ha. the Morocon affair v/as still .mr dlt is prolU-
able that she would h^v.. tc^ho. som.o step to do so during ^_r."^
Finally Gormany's foreign policy received a bloirr from yet another
direction because of the Libyan v;ar. Russia v/as roused from her in-
activity am throut;!- l^. ...^.o. -hy - .a- she shcvied for Italy during uli
war \.'as brought into better relations v;ith T' or. Italy came to regard
Russia more or less as a friend. Sho at least had displayed a much
more friendly attitude throughout : c ..^.r o..^:: either of Italy's alii
During the war Germany's hostility was evinced in a number of
',va,: s. From, th first Germany assisted th . Turks vv'ith arms and amuni-
tion. -hiver iiey caxic directly from Berlin to take charge of f -• op-
position in Tripoli, and continued to stir dissatisfaction in Tripoli
long after th e v;ar was over. Von der Goltz Pasha, chief of the Ger-
Military Mission a. Oor.stanvii.-.;. le, eiierted all of " is pov; or In dc-
1
^ong, Germany's Mediterranean League, Fortnightly Reviev;, 96: 889.
2 u:im:c : istory. Vol. 5, p 9.
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fense of Tripoli, and gave his influenco to tho Gontinua1:ion o-'' t-
j
The German press v;aB vinclicauivo from tlic beginning, and was in-
duced to rro'lify its attitude onljr by prudonco.^ In the storm of in-
vective Gn...riating fron tiio Geraan pros;-; upon her declaration of v/ar
,
It..l:; accused of docieving both of the partners to the Alliance,
of imperiling and neglecting German inter. - at Co stantino^-le anc"!
in Asia.
Such organs as t 3 FranJifur or Zeitung am. Lokal Aj/zeiger denounc-
the Italian -.var as an "act of violanco in times of -oe o: against wr.ic}
all civilizcu iiuropc, quite apart froi.i t..G c^uc-siio;. 01 political viev/£
and interests, must protest." Italj^ T;as accused of riding wantonaly
oyer the interests of her allies and subvertin;; 11 else to he:-:- part-
ic. liar ambitions.
-.i... lilur.ich Suddoutsche Honats.^iue in a article
fairl;; representative of the German press as a ..l.ole says, "Italy
]:as violated the international rig' tr: of the -^oo-olo of Eiiro--e. S]:c
Liotrays one after another those ...^o i.av j oe:r of servics uO her. She
is never faithful to her agreements except it is to the advantage of
hoT spirit -of greed to Izo^^r) her word. ' She is ready to fight today the
friend of yesterday for t}:o saho of any small advantage that may be
gained thereby. Todc
. iversal consent she has been allov/ed
to recover hor national frontiers, by th -^Ovvor thus acquir-^d ih
ual:cs more' -.uncliso of herself , tr.rcat cnir;^ to desert her closest friends
(German^/ and Austria) and to deliver these governm.ents into the hands
allace. Greater ItdL
: ,
. l.e .
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of ti.eii- encnies unless slio is porrnitted v.'ithout interfGr©nce to pros
cc'.'ite }- arnbitiouo dcsicris. Italj" war ^oYcr called u^on to invade
xr poli for the sal:e of forestalling sugI: rivals as England or Germany
She had no need to break the cirelG of nations which rag] lOcl: her
up in the -o-ninsala. It is evident t-iat Italy was really egged o.- in
her ^fricc^n adventuro by iiJngland , In order to set t\;o allies of Ger-
many by the ears at t:' e c!ritic...l moment of the Moroccon embr'oglio.
Instead of confining the ..ar to the arer of Tripoli, Italy has fement.
od a rising in -^Ibania and a revolt in _^rabia".
.iftor a time it is tr . , at the tone of the German prosp moder-
ated bat not befor: much dc^magc h-..d bezn done, and v/hen eventually il"
did au-.-tc it v;as ^QG^nBe the government, percGivin;_, oho aes liruc i-ivc
©fleets upon the Triple Alliance relations, discouraged farther ad-
verse comment.^
The Libyan ..ar changed in 2'®t another respect the situation of
It:^ly v;ith, rofer;nco to the Tri'-'le Alliance; for the acquisition of
tLe ne;v provinc: of Libya created a new se^ of considerations \vV:ich
boro directly upon Italy.'s foreign policies, and when Italy became
deeply involve--;, in Ilortl; .-frica her position 'v/as
,
ipso facto, altered
materially. The ne., provine vvould require for some tine a strong
garrison, even under Italian control, a feat v/hich has never been thO]|
oughly accomplis/ od. Sconom.ic and financial interosts of increasing
importe^nco would ue conoenuraued ia Libya. ' e ..iiic^^ions ..oald per-
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force bo hi^ v/ator, ar^cl t}i - most vital Imtores 'js, the vg 7 existonco
of Vi: ne\. colon^^ in..st depend upon t. o friendly atjitude of the power£
t}?.at controlled the se s, Fr.ince and England. "Vitii forty thousand
men in xripoli , v.itli a large quantity of v;ar material bound up t'loro,
v;i:}; Italian capital and Italian industry involved. It 1; could scare
ly afford in case of v/ar to lose all t: is; nor Lo lose t' e colony for
v.hich sho had paid such a price. Tith these consideration looming up
it ..ae a natter of primary self-inter est for I .^ly to c^ii ~. off her
moorings from the Triple .alliance (which in the event of v>ar vvould
render her lit. In if an" assir:tanco in Libya) and at t::G first oppor-
tunity to s'jiift to t:-.o side of the Triple Entente v.hicj-; controlled h
Mediterranean and' the vital linec: of communication between Italy and
1 or n ev;l- ^-.'^^ulrof
,
semi-pacific colony."^
xcstimc-.y to :hc; altera l:ion Italy's situation brought about by th<
T.ar and its influence upon the interrelation:; of the Triple- Alliaa c
nations Is found 1 statr-mnnt mad: by Sonnino in a dispatch to t'
Duhc of .:.varna during; the discussions which preceded the formal ab-
rogation of the Alliance in the spring of 1915. Banon Sonnino sc.-.ld,
"I must f-oint out th:.t t geographic positiori of Italy in t]- ?!ndit-
er •ancan forbids her showing any favor to one group of belligerents
that migy
. provake reprisals or h part of the other v.ho dominates
2
t::G se
. ,
unless she v;isheg to jeopardiz e the Y;hole of her economic
es:i stanc e. .Tliile Sonnono does not mention Libya in this dispatch it
is Quite probable that when >.e speaks of "reprisals" he has in mind
1-1 jyc, o-nd that when he mentions econom.ic intere;:;ts he refers, among
1
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other
-L->inGS, to those involved ±n Lib-r^. Thus tho v:._r placccL Italy
in a position vvhere she could no longer afford to maintain h©r placo
as a nonbor of tho Tripl-? Alliance.
It was logical thon, that v;hen the i'riple alliance should be put
to the actual test
,
the
. effects of the- Libyan war u::0n the alliance
should become . :r-;:.rar^ t; ana indeed the bost evidence to be found any-
v.i.erc of f;-.:. destructivo results, v;].ioi Libyan war had upon the
•Jri lc
-
.ancc, is i,.- t}:o official document regardinc the discussion
i/liic;". to ..!:
; ace amon^^ the nenbers of t" -^'ri- .-llianc= - e -
two:;.-, t] c ouLbrcah of t:,.Q liuropean Tar in I'JKl- and the. lormal repudi^
ation of the Triple Alliance by Italy in May 1915. Rcf eronces • to t
attitude of V-z o^-^tr "owers and especially Austria constantly rceu:
in Jhese documents from the first to the last, and time after time th
pov. ers v.- ere rominc
... stand they took during the libyan v/ar in
1911 and 1912. In a remarkably frank and oiits' o \ di spate-. jj...
Duke of .-^:;^arna on December 9th 191<:, Baron Sonnino says, "To render oi r
attitude effectively clear we must remind tlie Imperial and Royal Gov-
ernment that
,
b-slnr; the actions precisely r;pon what is set forth in
-krtielo bGven,it restricted us during.' our war- with Turkey from carr^z-
ing ou a several,^ military operations \:hich would have certainly short-
ened tl e duration of t:
.
,....r. The r.aTr.l r-orations in t} • Dardanelles
cave rise to formal
.
revoctions on the par o of the Imperial and Royal
1
G-overnment". Thrse days later, on December 12th, the Duke oe -ivarnci
replying to Sonnino' s dispatch describes the intcrvicr. with. Count
Berchtold in which he presented the Italian reprosen ..ation. At fh.a .:
1
I ualian Green Book, !lo. 1, Scott Edition, Vol. I, p. 1209.

(48)
tine he had laid conslderabl© emphasis on the opposition the Im-
perial <^nd Royal Govornment to our r:iiliu__y and naval operations dur-
infj tho I talo -Turkish war".^ In a dispatch to tho Duke of ^ivarna on
Docomber 16th i3aron Sonnino rehearses in brief tho representations of
the Austrian Government during tlrie Libjxan v.ar, asserting thaj the
Austrians attempted to }iinder tlio Italians from even "simple, military
operations", and further that "the attitude of Austria-JIungar:/ was
tho source o-£ a very sorioiiG Iocs to us alike in a military ^ ^
itical sense, since it encour resistance of Turliey, ..hich felt
indirectl;- supported and protected'',* He (Sonnino) then quot-d"t---:
osac t toi. .•-KjGd by that (the Austro-Hungarian) G-ovornment u..rii.^ th;:
Libyan v/ar" sayinr/'ln your tel3{2ram of ITov ember 5th 1911, your 3x-
Gcllancs? informed us that Count Aehrenthal had declared to you that
"action of ours on th'-j Ottoman coac : of Turkey in Europe or in .1.-
islands of th® Aegsan Sea could not be permitted either by .'xustria or
Germany because of beinr- op-;oos©d to the Triple, .alliance". Such a
declaration ..... . .. ^' y^i- liKccllen^y in consequence of a rumor cur-
rent to tho effect that Italian warships had ma'de use of soarck lights
in, uho neighborhood of Saloniki. In your telegram of tho 7th lovember
ISll Your E:<:collGncy informed us .^.a: "Count A©hr©nthal considers the
..ombc^rdmont of ports in European Turkey such as Scloniki, and Cavallo,
op;-'Osed to the provisions of the Seventh iirticle." In A->n'il 1912
Count Borchtold lodged strong protest because t-e It li^, :.c_,..^dron be-
fore the Dardanelles ^"ad damaged trc forts is replying to shots that
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(49)
v;L:ro fired upon it from them; on that ocoasion doclaring to you that
"if the Ro77al Italian Govornr.icn-. vyishod to rcoovor its literty of
action tlic Inporial and Hoyal GovQrnmcnc could do the same". But ho
could not admit that w© srould in the future undertal^e similar oper-
ations or an3' action v,>.atover that should bo oppose .. j point of
vie;; manifoctod ,in tho procsding conferoncos. Should any such ac:ion
1
DC -undcrtalren by us it might ho attendsd ho grave sonsoquences".
*
Finally late in May 1915 when the formal abrogation of the Tripl
-illiancG was at hand in a circular not® to tno Italian r Gpresentativo
•at foreign governments setting forth Italy's reasons for such action
IBaron Sonnino, speaking of Austrian hostility tov;ard It ly, says, "Of
i:Lo n^nr instances .Jiich could be cited it is enough to say that in
1911 when Italy was ©ngaged in war with. Turkey, the Austro-;;ungarian
Groneral Staff prepared a campaign against us, and the military party
•)roseGUu2d energetically a political intrigue designed to drag in oth
responsible elements of Austria; since that tim© ws have boon con-
stantly under apprehension of a sudden ..ttack whenever the party
opposed to us had the other hand in Vienna"..
Clearly do these discussions echo the Libyan war,; And indeed
th. t
-..as sharply outlined as the last mile post al jng the way of the •
xriplo -illianco_,. .l-o c oiisumma u iv c factor in its destruction; for as
is so luridly r ovealed by those discussions above noted,, the attitude
of her allies in 1911 and 1912 loft Italy with a lasting hostile im-
pression, alionated the sympathies of the Italian people, and gave a
n w trend to their political thought, in a v<ord sounded the death
of tho SriplG Alliance.
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Appondix IIo. I.
Article Seven of the Tripla Alliane© Treaty proviclos that the
status quo of tlis Balkans shall not bo disrupted unless nocessitatad
h-j tho intrusion of a third part:;-, for tho a-peararce of conditions
..-arrant ing the int c-rf©renc g of Italy or Austria, in which ©vent com-
pensation must ho made to tl e non-interfering nations."*"
Article Seven 'las been of great importance in the relations of
the Triple ^illiance liation;: and about its interpretation a great
many of the diplonatic discusf}:ions bot-v;[eon Italy and Austria during
the Italc-T'urhish v/ar and f - Great "'ar revolved. Tjio Italian urcei:
Bool: and the Second Austrian ;ied Book are filled with diplomatic rep^
rosentations which hinge upon Article Seven.
Austrian Red Book, Ko. 2, Appendix:' llo . I, Sc klition. Vol. II
pages 355-3:: 6.



